EU wants Hungary’s next leader to support Ukraine. It should be so lucky.

BUDAPEST — Péter Magyar, the front-runner in Hungary’s upcoming election, shows little sign of being the pro-Ukraine alternative many in Brussels are hoping for.

EU leaders, increasingly frustrated with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s obstruction of support for Kyiv, are quietly betting a Magyar victory on April 12 could reset relations — or at least ease tensions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

But on substance, Magyar often sounds strikingly similar to the man he’s trying to replace. He has opposed fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU membership, rejected sending weapons to Kyiv, and signaled he would put EU accession to a referendum — which could derail the process entirely.

His Tisza party also voted against a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine in the European Parliament, even though Hungary wasn’t required to contribute financially.

A nationalist who stresses putting Budapest’s interests first, Magyar has also previously criticized what he calls the erosion of Hungarian minority rights in Ukraine. “No one wants a pro-Ukrainian government,” he said March 28.

When Zelenskyy publicly clashed with Orbán over the Ukraine loan, Magyar even sided with the prime minister: “No foreign leader can threaten any Hungarian.”

Orbán, for his part, has tried to paint Magyar as a traitor aligned with Brussels and Kyiv — an attack that has struggled to land given the opposition leader’s own positioning.

That leaves Brussels in an awkward spot: hoping for change, but bracing for continuity.

“It’s making him a black box,” said Greens MEP Tineke Strik, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Hungary, at an event hosted in Budapest. “What would he prioritize if he would win the elections? That’s also for the EU actually a bit of a puzzle.”

Some diplomats and Ukrainian officials believe Magyar could soften his stance if he wins, particularly since unlocking billions in frozen EU funds is his priority.

“Following his public speeches, yes, he’s a bit more flexible — and we expect that,” said an adviser to the Ukrainian government. But there are few guarantees. Asked whether a Magyar-led Hungary would drop its veto on the €90 billion EU loan, a person familiar with Tisza’s thinking said it would ultimately depend on public sentiment.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv

In recent years Orbán has shifted closer to Russia while increasingly antagonizing Ukraine. His foreign minister has acknowledged briefing Moscow after sensitive EU meetings, and the government has pursued closer ties with Russian energy firms. In recent weeks Fidesz has also stoked deep-rooted anti-Ukrainian feeling, claiming Kyiv wants to drag Hungary into the war and drain its resources.

Hungarian Minister for European Union Affairs János Bóka talks to media before an EU General Affairs Ministers Council in Brussels in July 2025. | Thierry Monasse/Getty Images

“This is a historical concern. Hungarians don’t like Ukrainians. They don’t like Russians either, but they don’t like Ukrainians any better than the Russians,” Hungarian Minister for European Union Affairs János Bóka told POLITICO.

“We have a historic experience about the Ukrainians when it comes to organized crime, corruption and violence. And we have recent and not-so-recent unpleasant experience when it comes to the conflict between ethnic Hungarians and Ukrainians in Transcarpathia,” he said, referring to legislation that made Ukrainian the main language of education in the Zakarpatska region of western Ukraine, which put Kyiv on course for a clash with Budapest.

Magyar has walked a tightrope on this issue. As far as Russia is concerned, he has identified it as a weak spot for Orbán and accused the government of “outright treason” in its dealings with the Kremlin.

On Ukraine, he hasn’t framed Kyiv as an enemy — but has studiously avoided any positive appraisals, knowing they would play badly at the ballot box.

That’s because anti-Ukrainian sentiment is deeply rooted in Hungary. According to an autumn 2025 poll by the Policy Solutions think tank, half of Hungarians consider Ukraine dangerous for Hungary, while 64 percent oppose Ukraine’s EU accession and 74 percent believe the Hungarian government shouldn’t send financial aid to Kyiv.

Notably, Zelenskyy is one of the most hated politicians in the country, level with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Péter Magyar really doesn’t have big room for maneuver on Ukraine,” said Policy Solutions Director András Biró-Nagy. Orbán’s anti-Ukraine campaigning via Fidesz-aligned media over the last four years has sharply eroded support for Kyiv, he explained. “On Ukraine, there was no competing narrative … Magyar tries to avoid the issue because he thinks this is a lost cause; he cannot turn it around.”

During the Tisza-organized National Day events in March, a big Ukraine flag was unfurled among the crowd in protest. But Magyar and independent media accused Fidesz of staging the incident to stir controversy. “Once again, Fidesz and its propaganda machine could only muster pathetic lies and a provocation involving a Ukrainian flag,” Magyar said. The ruling party has denied the allegation.

Such attempts to stir up tensions are everywhere. The country’s streets are flooded with billboards depicting the Ukrainian president smiling, with the message: “Don’t let Zelenskyy have the last laugh.” And a new campaign poster design features black-and-white mugshots of Zelenskyy and Magyar under the slogan: “They are dangerous.”

“I cannot imagine a scarier thing than to declare the victim the aggressor … this is what Orbán is doing, it’s really stomach-turning and disgusting,” said MP Timea Szabó of the Dialogue for Hungary green party, who is running for reelection as an independent in a Budapest district.

Magyar: A puzzle for Brussels

Tisza is keen to start negotiating with the European Commission from day one to unblock any EU funds frozen over rule-of-law concerns — as Magyar has said in meetings with European heavyweights like German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. But the party program is rather thin on further commitments to Brussels, offering only vague promises of improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and EU institutions.

Meanwhile, in Magyar’s quest to show voters he is pro-European, Ukraine has become a topic best avoided. And he continues to keep Brussels at arm’s length to dodge Orbán’s accusations that he’s a puppet of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

A poster with images of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Tisza leader Péter Magyar in Budapest on March 18, 2026. | Jaap Arriens/NurPhoto via Getty Images

All in all, his credentials with the Brussels mainstream will need some repairing.

Although his Tisza party is a member of the EU’s center-right bloc — the European People’s Party (EPP) — Magyar and his EU parliamentarians didn’t show up to support von der Leyen and her Commission at a vote of no confidence in January, and were consequently punished by the group’s leadership.

Tisza also stood against the EU-Mercosur trade agreement — another EPP priority — while Magyar aims to reduce reliance on Russian oil imports only by 2035, far behind the EU’s binding 2027 deadline.

So does he really represent a massive shift from Orbán?

“He is aligning a lot on migration with what Fidesz is saying. He is quite prudent and even aligning [with Orbán] when it comes to Ukraine,” observed MEP Strik.

“He is not bashing the EU, but he is not defending the EU.”