Trump’s Iran gamble carries a political cost

Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s From Across the Pond column.

Last December, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth laid out the current administration’s National Defense Strategy, arguing that President Donald Trump was the true heir to former President Ronald Reagan’s strategy of peace through strength.

A key part of that strategy, Hegseth maintained, was the Weinberger Doctrine, which determined the principles for when and how the U.S. was to use military force. He then claimed that last June’s Operation Midnight Hammer against Iran had been “a textbook example” of that doctrine, its strikes “obliterating the Iranian nuclear program.”

But what about the current war against Iran? Does Operation Epic Fury also hold up against Weinberger’s tenets? Hegseth would surely have a tough time making that case — and for Trump, this could finally mean trouble.

In a November 1984 speech, then-Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger outlined six principles for military engagement that were, in many ways, drawn from lessons learned during that year’s disastrous Lebanon expedition and the failures in Vietnam a decade before. Unsurprisingly, Trump’s Iran war fails to meet virtually every single one.

First, Weinberger said, force should only be used if a vital national interest is at stake. And while Iran may be governed by an odious regime that has accumulated a vast arsenal of ballistic missiles, pursued a nuclear program and exported terrorism overseas, the U.S. has lived with this very regime for almost half a century.

Moreover, Tehran is weaker today than it has been in decades. Its economy is in shambles, its proxies have been decimated by Israel, and its allies in Syria have been ousted. The list doesn’t end there: Its nuclear program was buried deep underground after last year’s Israeli-U.S. bombing campaign; its missile stockpiles are dwindling; its production facilities are damaged; its air force can’t fly; its army can’t move beyond its borders; and its navy is little more than a coastal fleet.

So while the end of the Iranian regime would be a good thing, it’s hard to make the case that, weakened as it was by war, sanctions and mismanagement, Tehran posed enough of a threat to vital U.S. national interests to justify a preventive war.

Next come Weinberger’s second, third and fourth principles — that before deciding to use force, the U.S. needs to have clearly defined objectives, be wholeheartedly committed to achieving them, and deploy sufficient force to make sure it does. In the case of Iran, there are problems with all three.

For one, Trump and his aides have cited many different objectives: deposing the regime, ensuring Iran never has nuclear weapons, destroying the country’s missile capabilities, vanquishing its navy, ending support for its proxies and terrorism, exacting revenge for past attacks killing Americans, as well as ensuring Iran can never project force beyond its borders.

All these constitute a tall order, to say the least. Regime change, for one, is hard to achieve from the air, and yet it seems Washington has no intention of deploying ground troops to depose Iran’s regime, maintain order and assist a new one in taking over. And though airpower can do a lot to degrade and destroy the country’s nuclear program, missile capability and military in the short run, those are a means to an end.

What political objective would be served by effectively disarming Iran? What would constitute success for the U.S.? And how much force would be needed to achieve it? On this, the administration and the president have been silent.

A key part of that strategy, Pete Hegseth maintained, was the Weinberger Doctrine, which determined the principles for when and how the U.S. was to use military force. | Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images

Finally, we have Weinberger’s last two principles, which are the most exacting but also the most important in a democracy: First among them is having a “reasonable assurance” of public and congressional support for the contemplated action.

Here, the administration hasn’t even tried. In his State of the Union address just days before ordering the start of the war, Trump devoted only three of his 108 minutes to Iran. He emphasized that Iran needed to say the “secret words” that it would not get nuclear weapons — words it has uttered for decades — and never made the case to the public for war to achieve this or any other objective.

Also, in contrast to his two Republican predecessors who similarly embarked on wars in the Middle East in the past 30 years — George W. Bush and George H.W. Bush — Trump didn’t seek congressional support either. Rather, he has ignored Congress completely, despite its constitutional role to declare war.

Then comes the sixth and most obvious Weinberger principle: War should be a last resort. And what’s unfolding now is anything but. Twice the U.S. engaged in direct and indirect talks with Iran over its nuclear program, and twice Trump decided to go to war rather than see whether a deal was possible.

Moreover, the U.S. negotiating team consisted of two entrepreneurs close to the president — his son-in-law Jared Kushner and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff — both of whom know little about the intricacies of nuclear weapons and programs. For example, just days before the talks, Witkoff told Fox News that Iran was “a week away” from making “industrial-grade bomb-making material” — except, in reality, Iran was in no position to enrich any of its uranium since the material was buried deep underground, and there’s no evidence that it even had operable enrichment centrifuges.

Witkoff also claimed that Iran had suggested it had sufficient nuclear material to make 11 bombs, and that this fact had been hidden from inspectors. But the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is responsible for verifying nuclear activities, was well aware of exactly how much uranium Iran had enriched after Trump ripped up the last nuclear deal in 2018.

The truth is, Iran was nowhere near getting a nuclear weapon. It wouldn’t have the capacity to build a long-range missile that could hit the U.S. for many years. It had no intention of striking U.S. forces in the Middle East first. And there were other ways to address these long-term threats.

Moreover, the U.S. negotiating team consisted of two entrepreneurs close to the president — his son-in-law Jared Kushner and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff — both of whom know little about the intricacies of nuclear weapons and programs. | Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Trump’s decision to go to war wasn’t a last resort — it was a dangerous gamble that force could achieve what diplomacy could not, and it was wholly inconsistent with the Weinberger Doctrine that Hegseth touted as the administration’s guide.

Of course, like all gambles, this all might just pay off. But it’s far more likely to end badly, with a new Iranian regime that’s even more determined to exact revenge, using terror and other means to strike back. If so, the cost for Trump will be significant.

Just as Bush paid a heavy toll for his Iraq misadventure, and Trump’s predecessor Joe Biden paid dearly for the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, there will be a steep political price for this unnecessary and dangerous wager come November.